> > attack, but we maintained independent commands. This was to cause
> > problems in the midst of combat.
>
> What sort of problems? Did the tanker want you to go first and he
> supports from behind, or he goes first and you'll catch him later,
> or did you disagree on the distribution of the tanks, ...
Our command problems came in two flavors. First the two COs had a major
difference in outlook. I wrote my orders in more general terms, using
landmarks as reference points, using axis of advance, ect. My partner was
interested in assigning his units to specific hexes. We mostly seem to
talk past one another. In general I wanted to concentrate the tanks with
the infantry and attack on a narrow front. The CO of 2/49 wanted to
spread the tanks out and cover and protect the attack going into Stonne.
So, how Lee organized the orders between us is beyond me..
It seems as if combat clarified things in two ways: a) the tankers
followed through on the success of the initial attack, and b) the tankers
recognized the benefit of having infantry support and thus stayed with the
grunts beyond what their CO wanted. I may be off base but once the two
units were embroiled in combat it was nearly impossible for them to go
their separate ways. The second flavor of problem came from our orders.
While 2/67 and 2/49 were to work together the goal for each unit appears
to have been different. I received one long message from the CO of 2/49
explaining and outlining his orders. It seems we were to start out
together but then split off. He was to stay and protect the flank of
Stonne while other units attacked into the town. 2/67 was to attack north
then when past Stonne, swing to the west, until directly north of Stonne.
Needless to say 2/67 never made it north of Stonne.
> > 1640 Finds 2/67 and 2/49 engaged in heavy fighting. The command
> > confusion continues but combat makes sorting things out difficult. Our
> > advance continues but is significantly slowed. We take serious hits from
> > the Boche. The Germans try to envelope our right flank but our unit
> > holds. Yet many brave French lads gave up their lives to keep the flank
> > intact.
>
> That must have been the attack on II/GD. How were they deployed? My
To the best of my knowledge they advanced on a three hex front, tanks and
infantry with the tanks moving through clear terrain first followed by the
grunts. Once in the woods they worked together. At this point (1640) my
notes from Lee have each company working in a two hex front. Beyond that
I haven't any info.
>
> > The radio crackles to life and brings some fresh intel to our unit. It
> > warns of an upcoming Boche attack, naming 2 & 3 of SR 69, supported by
> > 6-II-8. The French overall CO suggests flattening our line and protect
>
> Where did #that# intelligence come from? I radioed almost
> continuously, am I the culprit? Bloody hell, no wonder you always
> were already there!
>
This was the only specific note from Flavigny concering enemy intel during
this operation. Lee may have included more subtle items in his turn
summaries. How we got this intel Lee will have to share with us :-> I
know early in the game Flavigny "ordered" us to use some other form of
communication than the radio. Our best method was for both CO's to move
into the same hex. When I commanded 6 GRDI this method was used in the
attack to the north with 67 RI. Arnaud Bouis was CO for 67 RI and did a
great job of coordinating this attack. When formulating my plans for 2/67
I followed much of the stuff Arnaud shared as we planned our earlier
attack. Thanks Arnaud!
> > back under heavy pressure but knocks out a Boche tank and hammers some
> > German infantry. 3rd Co gets into position in just the nick of time as
> > the Germans send troops trying to turn our flank. Even though severely
> > weakened they hold, but barely.
>
> That were my troops, unfortunately unable to rout you!
>
Lee made it sound as if you came within a whisker of doing just that!
Thanks for the comments, Markus. I enjoyed reading how you planned your
defense and organized your counter-attack. Again, the move to the south
was unnerving. Had it succeeded......
Peace,
Mike
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Date: Sat, 18 Jan 1997 01:23:38 +0100
From Markus.Kaessbohrer@surfserv.koblenz.netsurf.de Fri Jan 17 19:12
To: Lee Forester
Subject: re:GD '40 website
On 16 Jan 97, Lee Forester gave me the pleasure of reading (on re:GD
'40 website):
Hello Lee,
> >Aufkl 90 could have made the progress that they did. Whichever way it
> >turns, the idea to take Stonne so late that the game would end before
> >a counter-attack could develop in full was brilliant.
... notwithstanding that I think the original French plan was bold
to the point of recklessness. We co-operated perfectly in that we
reacted very inadequately, but let us now assume that III/GD might
have won the initiative and/or not lost the ini die roll on the
first turn, in any event not been mostly crippled so early. Let us
further assume we would have gotten together an attack by StPio and
4/II/8, with II/GD added as soon as possible, on both sides of the
main E/W road with the intent of catching the apparent French left
flank sweep in flank and rear. Whatever French were on the heels of
III/GD northward of this counterattack would be cut off from their
reinforcements and get rolled over by ours. Whatever was south might
not have orders, and if they did they would be the wrong ones, ie
not for an attack directly westwards. That's hindsight, but it does
seem something fairly natural to do, throw the strongest maneuvre
group you can put together into the flank of the enemy advance.
> the French stopped you in the woods was because of their tank
> support, and because you committed only 2 companies to the attack.
Given that I was to defend Stonne, I found that cheeky already. Maybe
I should have put 1/69 in reserve instead of defence. But then I was
told I'd be escorted into Stonne by tons of other troops!
> when not to. Overall though the Germans had the forces to smash
> the French if they had been commanded well. Maybe next time!
Certainly. Or maybe I'll be on the Russian side and roll over them
with T-34s... ;)
> II/69 did VERY well in the counterattack, but then they ran into
> French tanks in STonne, which stopped them. Aufk. 90 had shot
> its bolt, because it no longer many tanks with P-type weapons.
> Even if the German attack had gotten into Stonne and stayed,
> the relative attrition was very much against the Germans. So what
> you say makes a lot of sense.
As a matter of fact we lost not only IR GD, but also reduced 10. Pz
Div to a reinforced batallion Kampfgruppe (assuming that somewhere
the other half of its tanks was still around), what an utter
disaster.
> Is it OK if I add this to the archived discussion? Either way is
Do go ahead.
One more question: how much signals intelligence did both sides get,
and how many messages got plain lost? I'd be gladdest about a table
of time, sender and content, but I'll take anything...
And one last thing, I'll be off skiing for a week from tomorrow. I'll
probably find a mountain of mail waiting when I come back...
- Markus K.
kassbohr@whu-koblenz.de is gone, don't use it
The above is my opinion and/or invention. Where applicable
(eg excluding quotes), it is my copyright.
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Date: Sat, 18 Jan 1997 01:23:39 +0100
From: Markus Kaessbohrer
Subject: Re: GD '40: who was 2/67?
To: forester+gd40-list@HOPE.CIT.HOPE.EDU
Cc: forester+gd40-list@HOPE.CIT.HOPE.EDU
On 16 Jan 97, Mike Kroona gave me the pleasure of reading (on Re: GD
'40: who was 2/67?):
> explaining and outlining his orders. It seems we were to start out
> together but then split off. He was to stay and protect the flank of
> Stonne while other units attacked into the town. 2/67 was to attack north
> then when past Stonne, swing to the west, until directly north of Stonne.
Thanks for the explanations. Goodness, this plan was even more
complicated than it seemed at first. Weren't you lucky your
opposition co-operated so perfectly...
> > > warns of an upcoming Boche attack, naming 2 & 3 of SR 69, supported by
With company numbers, it must have been either from me or from Lange.
> Lee made it sound as if you came within a whisker of doing just that!
A look at the Web site tells me I got all the way to get my
attacking companies shot off the board. Lee, could we perhaps get
ending batallion morales, too?
Anyways, the more we debate, the more the conclusion is, terrific
game, brilliantly gamemastered, when does the next one start? I fear
I am not good enough in handling the tactical subtleties of the TCS
to trust myself to optimally handle such a thing, and I probably
wouldn't be up to the turn frequencies that most participants would
want to get, so I probably shouldn't just host one myself. But I
would most enthusiastically support any other game master in any way
I can.
- Markus K.
kassbohr@whu-koblenz.de is gone, don't use it
The above is my opinion and/or invention. Where applicable
(eg excluding quotes), it is my copyright.
Back to Top
From VEERMAN@delphi.com Sat Jan 18 07:16 EST 1997
Date: Sat, 18 Jan 1997 07:15:37 -0500 (EST)
From: VEERMAN@delphi.com
Subject: Casualties
To: forester+gd40-list@HOPE.CIT.HOPE.EDU
I was reviewing the home page, and was sort of surprised I had only 9 steps
of infantry left in the 16BCP. This surprised me since I knew I had taken
some step losses from aircraft moving from the map edge to Stonne, but had
no idea I would have only 9 of 45 steps of infantry left. I may have lost a
number at the end of the last turn, which I won't know until I review the
video. I can't help think at the end of the game, as Major Mortiguire
(commander of 16BCP) addresses two platoons of men and a smatering of the
HW Company, " Well men, you have done a great job, and will soon round up
the remainder of the 16BCP, and move on to attack the Germans again and
drive them out of France."
At the time, the highest ranking man present, a sargent replies "But sir,
this is all of the 16 BCP."
Since you don't have the view of the game from above, you loose the
knowledge of the status of your remaining troops until it is finally time to
get your command together again. This must have occured countless times
during the war, where local commanders did not realize the extent of losses
until the end. It is just a different feeling then you get compared to when
you play the TCS Series of games looking at the map in front of you.
Mark Veerman
Commander of 16 BCP
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From Lee
Just a few comments while I have a minute:
The last turn I wasn't as informative (due to a time rush on my
part) so the true extent of the fighting might not have been
apparant. 16 BCP was subjected to some tough direct fire,
and had lost a LOT to constant air attack and some artillery
while they were trying their flanking movement to the south
of Stonne. Hence the high casualties.
I handled intelligence in a rather straightforward manner. For
each radio message, I rolled a D6 and on a '6' it was intercepted,
in whole or in part. I can hear the screams already, so don't
bother :-) At the beginning of the game I was very clear on
the possibility of intercepted communications, and both overall
commanders knew all about it. Whether they acted on it or
not is another matter. The French got a LOT of intercepts because
the Germans were yacking on the radio so much. However,
because of the French inflexibility they really couldn't take
advantage of anything they learned. It did help their morale
though having an idea of what was going on.
I'm torn on how to handle communications in another such game.
On the one hand, players talked to each other way too much,
compared to what they could have actually done. So there
was too much communication from the point of view of 'realism'
or whatever. On the other hand, this is a communal game, and
most players felt pretty isolated. Realistic, but not so much fun.
I think I would recommend a game with fewer players (maybe around
6-8), turns = 1 hr, pretty good pace (so not much micro control) and
limited communications. If the game speeds up, then that keeps
it interesting. I think I would assign action points sort of like the
CWB for orders, only do those for communications, so you need
to choose carefully who you talk to and how much you say. I also
would put in more reliability stuff. As it was, all messages were
pretty much delivered, so I didn't distort things any. It was
confusing enough as it was!
I'm waiting for Flavigny to get on-line with his mail. He just
got onto AOL and has looked at the website, but he has a lot
to say, and hopefully will be able to contribute to the discussion
very soon.
Re: the videos - I found out I can ship them book rate, so now
they cost $5.00. I've only gotten $$$ for 2 of them. Did I go
through all that trouble for nothing? E-mail me if you want one
and I'll send it out. If you sent me a check for more that $5.00
I'll write one back to you for the remainder.
Does anyone want to keep the messages archive for me and code
it into HTML? I'm pretty busy right now, and some help would be
appreciated if there's anyone out there that can do it.
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From jhl@a-d-inc.com Sat Jan 18 12:52 EST 1997
From: Jim Lauffenburger
To: "'Lee Forester'"
Subject: RE: GD ''40 discussion
Date: Sat, 18 Jan 1997 09:53:38 -0700
I begged our OC several times for a list of "code words" - he
never responded. I am glad that the intercept rate was
that high, it ought to make things a bit more "realistic" next time.
I'm running a limited-comm Barren Victory game, in which I
give each commander a limited number of Command Points
each turn. He can use them on various things like movement,
or on messages (lower cost per word for verbal than written).
Also, messages roll for distortion and delay similarly to orders.
Distorted orders and messages are delivered, not thrown away.
My big worry is that the lack of discussion will make game less
interesting for most players (the communal aspects as you put
it).
Jim
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Date: Sat, 18 Jan 1997 10:50:38 -0700
From: Jim Lauffenburger
Subject: I/GD substitute
To: "'forester+gd40-list@HOPE.CIT.HOPE.EDU'"
I joined the game at roughly 1100, as the replacement
commander for I/GD.
Approx 1100:
I immediately had a number of severe "complaints" about
my "initial" position:
1) I was "personally" located back north of Pt 208. My
men were all deployed in / near Stonne! Worse, there
were already fears of the French interdicting the main
route to my men. So, I could effectively only communicate
to my own men via radio! I could not even believe that I
was so far separated from my men!
2) My reserve company (3rd) was already committed to
Huttes d'Ogne defense. Contact with III/GD and the StuPios
had already been lost! This put my reserve company
effectively in the front lines! Also, my mortars were deployed
WEST of Huttes!
3) My main force (1st and 2nd company, plus lots of AT
assets) was committed to defending Stonne, working on, or
just achieving a Hasty Defense. It had already
suffered a lot of losses from air and artillery. In my opinion,
the positions it had taken up were idiotic. It was deployed
in the open several hexes south of Stonne, in plain sight!
What a magnet for air and arty attacks! Worse, in my opinion is
that my StGs were deployed out in the open in stationary
positions. I would much prefer to keep mobile units out
of sight and make the enemy worry about their location.
If the enemy can see them sitting there, they know that the
units aren't anywhere else. If the units are invisible, then
the enemy has to wonder a bit.
4) We had virtually no communication from our OC, and
no plan that I was aware of. (Other than hold our positions.)
I asked for code words via runner for communication by
radio, but got no response. (In fact, not one of my questions
to my OC was answered during the entire game!) My only
known orders were to "hold".
I immediately started a "personal" move toward Stonne, via
Point 235. (I never made it to Stonne, but got caught up in
the eventual attack by the French around Pt 235!)
I also immediately pulled my men back out of sight into
Stonne, and tried to get the StGs out of sight. Of course,
right on my FIRST TURN, before my men moved, a particularly
devastating artillery barrage hit the exposed men, and I
lost most of the 2nd company. As I recall, only one platoon
was left of the 2nd at the end of my first turn. (But, casualties
were never clear, especially since I was so far to the rear
and only got scattered reports.)
I also rearranged my men at Huttes, to get the mortars back
out of the very front lines.
Approx 1200:
The French attack on Huttes knocked my 3rd Company back.
It continued back toward Pt235 where it was eventually destroyed
(within about 2 hours). Since this was my reserve company,
and it had already been committed prior to my starting the game,
it had no orders, and it never was able to get orders. So, for
a number of turns it basically just got stomped by the French
tanks. I had no clue as to how many French tanks were attacking,
nor whether I did any damage to them during their attack through
Huttes. Does anyone know?
Since Stonne was undergoing severe artillery barrages, I thought
that there must be French observers in the ridge/woods to the west,
at maybe 30.15 or thereabouts. Was there?
I tried to take a slightly more active role with my Stonne troops and
move/recon into that area. I stumbled into another devastating
artillery barrage and lost another platoon of the 1st Company. So,
I became convinced that there must be a French observer in that
area, but didn't know what to do about it.
Approx 1300:
My Stonne men were still working on Prep Def orders, and my
3rd Co was still getting beat on SW of Pt235.
I had become convinced some time earlier that the main French attack
on Stonne was going to come along the ridge from the West. (I didn't
think that the French had so many troops that they could do all that
they were doing in the West, and still attack from the SE!!!)
So, I had spent a lot of time trying to talk the other commanders
into counterattacking into the Huttes d'Ogne area. I was hoping
to catch the support tail of the French as they were attacking
Stonne. (I could also hope to catch some French without orders
after their successful attack.)
After many radio messages, all I could get was II/GD to help out
north of Stonne. This was a big mistake on my part, as I talked
him into moving just before the French attack came from the
SE! Sorry!!! (I could not believe that the French still had units
uncommitted that weren't in the West somewhere. Especially
since it felt like all we had was I/GD and II/GD - I was aware of some
few units up near Raminoise, but they claimed they were not having
a pleasant time and were in trouble.)
Anyway, my massive "propaganda" campaign to counterattack
toward Huttes only resulted in a totally screwed up II/GD
position east of Stonne. I am definitely to blame for this,
not II/GD commander.
Approx 1400:
Sometime around here, my 3rd Co dissolved, and it was clear my
command team would never make it into Stonne. So, I asked
II/GD to directly command what was left of my men in Stonne,
since he was in contact with them.
I had been only getting intermittent reports that they were suffering
from artillery and didn't have much left, but also that they just
achieved a Prep Defense state.
So, I sat out the rest of the game...
Until
1800:
I was asked to take II/69. They were located at Raymoy, with orders
to attack Stonne. Since there was very little time left in the game, I
had my doubts that they could do anything, but I set them in motion.
In very few turns they made it down the road, across the "meadow"
north of Stonne, and up the ridge.
Again, I screwed up: my 7th Company swept wide and got
tangled up with somebody (I have no clue who) in the woods north
of Stonne.
So, as the game ended, my men were on the verge of taking
Stonne from the north, maybe...
Jim Lauffenburger
It was very enjoyable (except for my stupid initial situation), and
Lee did an outstanding job!
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Date: Mon, 20 Jan 1997 10:15:01 -0700
From: John Lang
Subject: Re: GD '40: who was 2/67?
To: forester+gd40-list@HOPE.CIT.HOPE.EDU
> That must have been the attack on II/GD. How were they deployed? My
> plan before I was cut off from the net had been to have the MG
> platoons at the edge of the woods, providing observation and
> harassment. They would retreat before a serious assault. The infantry
> companies would be one on the hill finger E of Stonne (Butte de
> Stonne) with infantry and AT guns and firing at everything in range,
> one in a line just inside the woods, again with AT guns, in reserve
> (to be committed to defence as soon as the MG troops saw an attack
> coming in earnest), and one company in Candrieres, possibly with
> StuG, to attack into the right flank of an enemy assault (ie they had
> an implemented attack order but hadn't yet moved).
Early on, this was pretty close to the disposition, except I had no
IG's or AT guns or StuGs (4-II-8 having been ordered into reserve).
I don't know what happened to the IG's or AT guns, since I didn't
have any to begin with. The only adjustment I made to your
disposition was to spread the MG's around a little more, and
to make the observation platoon one of 7/II rather then 5/II
(so all the Co units were closer together). Didn't matter however
since I got requests to close the back door once all hell broke
loose around Hurtes d'Ogne, so I implemented the Reserve opsheet,
and off I went.
Given my general lack of AT assets, I don't know how much good I would
have done if I had stayed, but it might have given I/69 and KG Lange
some more room to manuver.
John Lang
II/GD
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Date: Sun, 26 Jan 1997 00:52:40 +0100
From: Markus Kaessbohrer
Subject: Re: GD '40: who was 2/67?
To: forester+gd40-list@HOPE.CIT.HOPE.EDU
On 20 Jan 97, John Lang gave me the pleasure of reading (on Re: GD
'40: who was 2/67?):
> > Stonne) with infantry and AT guns and firing at everything in range,
> > one in a line just inside the woods, again with AT guns, in reserve
> > (to be committed to defence as soon as the MG troops saw an attack
> > coming in earnest), and one company in Candrieres, possibly with
> > StuG, to attack into the right flank of an enemy assault (ie they had
> Early on, this was pretty close to the disposition, except I had no
> IG's or AT guns or StuGs (4-II-8 having been ordered into reserve).
I seem to have lost that mail, but I think I recall being promised 2+
IGs and something like four or six AT guns, plus possibly two StuGs
or thereabouts. It soon became clear that no StuGs would be coming my
way, but I did reckon with the AT guns especially. Leaving you
without those was another sign of how badly things went for us!
> Given my general lack of AT assets, I don't know how much good I would
> have done if I had stayed, but it might have given I/69 and KG Lange
> some more room to manuver.
I/69 would definitely have profited from not getting almost wiped out
fighting its way through the woods, although I fear without your
company in the Bois de Raucourt I wouldn't have got there (or indeed
into the pt 251 assembly area) without a fight in the first place. It
all gets down to the French using temporary superiourity to good
effect with no co-ordinated response at all.
- Markus K.
kassbohr@whu-koblenz.de is gone, don't use it
The above is my opinion and/or invention. Where applicable
(eg excluding quotes), it is my copyright.
Back to Top
From: "Markus Kaessbohrer"
Organization: Myself only
To: Lee Forester
Date: Sun, 26 Jan 1997 00:52:42 +0100
On 18 Jan 97, Lee Forester gave me the pleasure of reading (on re: GD
''40 discussion):
> I handled intelligence in a rather straightforward manner. For
> each radio message, I rolled a D6 and on a '6' it was intercepted,
> in whole or in part. I can hear the screams already, so don't
YIKES! Here's one of the screams. I figured about one intercept in
twenty. Dear me. I suppose code name charts will be the order of the
day in GD '41.
- Markus K.
kassbohr@whu-koblenz.de is gone, don't use it
The above is my opinion and/or invention. Where applicable
(eg excluding quotes), it is my copyright.
Back to Top
Date: Mon, 03 Feb 1997 05:23:01 -0700
From: Jim Lauffenburger
Subject: Watching the Video
To: "'forester+gd40-list@hope.cit.hope.edu'"
I really appreciate the opportunity to watch the replay!
Thanks, Lee for recording it!
A number of things struck me as I watched it:
1) When I was invited to join the game as I/GD commander
at about 11:00 AM I remember a distinct feeling of hopelessness.
I already listed the reasons why in my previous posting, but
the video really hit home! I think I felt even more hopeless watching
the video! Here is this immense blue horde sweeping around
the west, while my I/GD was stuck in Stonne getting the snot
bombarded out of it! And it seemed that all that was in the way
was my lone reserve company in Huttes d'Ogne! I wasn't sure
at the time whether my impression was correct, but the video
showed me that I wasn't afraid enough!!!
2) The French commander truly had a much better plan!
3) Given that my HQ (myself) started near Pt 208 at about 11:00
and made a grand tour of the battlefield trying to get to Stonne,
I think we must have been walking with blinders on. My reports
never mentioned the vast quantities of troops (enemy and friendly)
that we walked by and around. Was this the "empty battlefield"
phenomenon, or just bad luck (timing) on my part?
4) I realized quickly that a French spotter had his eyes on Stonne,
and though I obviously could not know where he was, I had guessed
that he was on the ridge/woods line to the west of Stonne (I mentioned
this in about every report I made). I tried every means I think I had at my
disposal to rid myself of it:
a) I moved my infantry there in order to sweep the area to the limits of
my allowed movement (3 hexes from Stonne). This cost me a platoon
as the spotter called down some wonderful shots.
b) I "recon'd" with my StGs to avoid the artillery. This cost me the
ridicule of Lee as he pointed out the foolishness of using tanks to
clear woods.
c) I requested artillery missions along the ridge nearly every turn. I
think only one was fulfilled, with unknown results (it certainly didn't
hurt the spotter.
This leaves me wondering about the power of FO's. I know this was an
active thread in the general Gamers' discussion list, and I feel a bit like
Dean said he felt when he was a Ranger and his umpires said he lost
because they didn't hunt down the spotter in the surrounding hills.
As a result, I have a few "mechanics" questions: Could I have
violated my "3-hex limit" orders to conduct sweeps
with my infantry? Could I have generated patrols with less than a single
unit of strength to try to clear the area? (ie, not move my main units,
but have them send out sub-units?)
5) A comment made by Lee near the end of the game got me wondering.
The distinct impression left by watching the video is that the French got massive
reinforcements and they got them hours early. (Perhaps the main words from
the video that struck me for the first several minutes were repetitions of something
like: "the French received unit "such and such" "N" hours early.)
At the end of the game, Lee said that the Germans got massive reinforcements
compared to the French.
When I watched the video, it seemed that the French got everything except the
1-57RI, and the Germans got everything except the 13InfGun. Further, since
I was the (only?) commander of the II/69 I know that it didn't start to move until
the last hour of the game. I don't know when it actually arrived on the board and
how long it sat waiting for orders. It seems that it certainly arrived far later than
the 1100 listed as its availability.
Finally getting to the question: what reinforcements came on, and when, for
each side?
6) At the end of the game, I ordered the 7th Co of II/69 to be the right flank
of my attack on Stonne. After the first move, I was told that I had lost contact
with them. I took this to mean that they had run into some French troops on
the right flank and got hung up there. As a result, the attack went in without
their help. (Given the horde of French in Stonne, I don't think they would have
made much difference.) Watching the video, I got the impression that they
were purposely sent by me to wander off into the woods and not attack. Did
you introduce some random event, or was this a result of less-than-clear
orders on my part?
After seeing this, the grumbling wargamer in me would prefer a far more
detailed situation report, while the realist in me knows what we got was
far more accurate!
Thanks again for all your effort, Lee!
Jim Lauffenburger
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Date: Mon, 03 Feb 1997 09:44:49 -0500
From: Lee Forester
Subject: Re: Watching the Video
To: forester+gd40-list@HOPE.CIT.HOPE.EDU, jhl@a-d-inc.com
>I really appreciate the opportunity to watch the replay!
>Thanks, Lee for recording it!
Sure. This answers a question of mine as to whether it
was worth it to film the whole game. I used it to create
the replay, so that was nice (didn't have to write everything down
all the time). It sounds like the players can get something
out of it too.
>3) Given that my HQ (myself) started near Pt 208 at about 11:00
>and made a grand tour of the battlefield trying to get to Stonne,
>I think we must have been walking with blinders on. My reports
>never mentioned the vast quantities of troops (enemy and friendly)
>that we walked by and around. Was this the "empty battlefield"
>phenomenon, or just bad luck (timing) on my part?
Some of both as I recall. Much as the woods were loaded, sometime
troops passed by each other without noticing.
In addition, I really didn't mention other stuff to keep the
battlefield empty, and if I figured the unit involved had more
things to worry about. Most commanders are aware of friendly
units when they have time to think about it and when it has a bearing
on their immediate actions. Because game players have more time
and much less to worry about, they will tend to give progress
reports to everyone to keep everyone posted. I tried to keep
this to a reasonable limit, often by simply controling the information
that got out to players. Nasty of me, eh? ;-)
>4) I realized quickly that a French spotter had his eyes on Stonne,
>and though I obviously could not know where he was, I had guessed
>that he was on the ridge/woods line to the west of Stonne (I mentioned
>this in about every report I made). I tried every means I think I had at my
>disposal to rid myself of it:
>a) I moved my infantry there in order to sweep the area to the limits of
>my allowed movement (3 hexes from Stonne). This cost me a platoon
>as the spotter called down some wonderful shots.
>b) I "recon'd" with my StGs to avoid the artillery. This cost me the
>ridicule of Lee as he pointed out the foolishness of using tanks to
>clear woods.
>c) I requested artillery missions along the ridge nearly every turn. I
>think only one was fulfilled, with unknown results (it certainly didn't
>hurt the spotter.
It paralyzed him. Just so you know, that spotter had a rough time.
Retreating elements of Stu.Pio. ran over it (and the spotter barely
fought them off). Your infantry and tanks scared the @(#*!@(* out of
him, arty fire etc. harrassed it, then it lost radio contact, etc.
There was another spotter north of Stonne that took over the bombarding
duties later in the day.
>This leaves me wondering about the power of FO's. I know this was an
>active thread in the general Gamers' discussion list, and I feel a bit like
>Dean said he felt when he was a Ranger and his umpires said he lost
>because they didn't hunt down the spotter in the surrounding hills.
>As a result, I have a few "mechanics" questions: Could I have
>violated my "3-hex limit" orders to conduct sweeps
>with my infantry? Could I have generated patrols with less than a single
>unit of strength to try to clear the area? (ie, not move my main units,
>but have them send out sub-units?)
Not really. Remember that your orders were to protect against an immediate
attack on Stonne, so there was no time for that sort of thing. Better
orders would have helped you immensely. Like I said, the spotter was
not invulnerable. A sweep would probably have taken him out.
>5) A comment made by Lee near the end of the game got me wondering.
>The distinct impression left by watching the video is that the French got massive
>reinforcements and they got them hours early. (Perhaps the main words from
>the video that struck me for the first several minutes were repetitions of somet
>hing like: "the French received unit "such and such" "N" hours early.)
>At the end of the game, Lee said that the Germans got massive reinforcements
>compared to the French.
The French got some good ones up front and had op sheets already written
for them. The initial French plan had OPS for every single unit that could
have come on, so they were well integrated.
>When I watched the video, it seemed that the French got everything except the
>1-57RI, and the Germans got everything except the 13InfGun. Further, since
>I was the (only?) commander of the II/69 I know that it didn't start to move until
>the last hour of the game. I don't know when it actually arrived on the board and
>how long it sat waiting for orders. It seems that it certainly arrived far later than
>the 1100 listed as its availability.
The Germans had more overall. The sea of blue had bee significantly cut
down by the end of the game, as the II-69 and Lehr were a powerful combination.
Considering how much the French had trashed the Germans during the day,
the fact that it was almost evened out by evening showed that there were
more Germans involved. The French did not receive any reinforcements after
about 3:00 I think.
>Finally getting to the question: what reinforcements came on, and when, for
>each side?
I don't remember the times exactly, but looking at the afteraction reports
and a list of the players (with units commanded) will let you know pretty
much what units came on and when.
>6) At the end of the game, I ordered the 7th Co of II/69 to be the right flank
>of my attack on Stonne. After the first move, I was told that I had lost contac
>twith them. I took this to mean that they had run into some French troops on
>the right flank and got hung up there. As a result, the attack went in without
>their help. (Given the horde of French in Stonne, I don't think they would have
>made much difference.) Watching the video, I got the impression that they
>were purposely sent by me to wander off into the woods and not attack. Did
>you introduce some random event, or was this a result of less-than-clear
>orders on my part?
They followed their orders :-) They were given a route to take, and they
took it as they understood it. They hustled and got into it the last
turn. AND they did get hung up for a while by some good barrages (as
did another company of your battalion). Considering the speed of your
advance, the French resistance (French units north of Stonne), the heavy
artillery barrages encountered, etc. the unit performed very well,
pretty much defeating the I-67 plus a company of the 45th BCC in the
last hour of the game.
>After seeing this, the grumbling wargamer in me would prefer a far more
>detailed situation report, while the realist in me knows what we got was
>far more accurate!
I think some sort of middle path is the best, balancing 'realism' with
actually wanting to play a wargame :-)
>Thanks again for all your effort, Lee!
No prob. Now we'll just have to wait for Perry...
Lee
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Date: Mon, 03 Feb 1997 23:28:00 +0100
From: Markus Kaessbohrer
Subject: Re: Watching the Video
To: forester+gd40-list@HOPE.CIT.HOPE.EDU
On 3 Feb 97, Lee Forester gave me the pleasure of reading (on Re:
Watching the Video):
> this to a reasonable limit, often by simply controling the information
> that got out to players. Nasty of me, eh? ;-)
... and very effective, too! At one point, my I/69 was passing the
HQ of I/GD and battered remains of II/GD's 'northern' company in the
same turn, and my turn results mentioned neither. Then those two
mentioned said units in their communications to me, and I raised half
a panic about the enemy having penetrated our radio net.
> >5) A comment made by Lee near the end of the game got me wondering.
> >The distinct impression left by watching the video is that the French got massive
> >reinforcements and they got them hours early. (Perhaps the main words from
>
> The Germans had more overall. The sea of blue had bee significantly cut
> down by the end of the game, as the II-69 and Lehr were a powerful combination.
> Considering how much the French had trashed the Germans during the day,
> the fact that it was almost evened out by evening showed that there were
> more Germans involved. The French did not receive any reinforcements after
> about 3:00 I think.
Some of our reinforcements were also wasted. Take I/69. I entered at
1400, then was sent around and through the woods and wherever, so
that I had no impact on the battlefield until it was almost 1700.
Still, a temporarily overwhealming numerical and especially tank
superiourity was all the French needed to overpower enough Germans
that even with the massive wave of reinforcements at the end (which
didn't have that much time to make itself felt on top of it), they
ended up ahead.
> >After seeing this, the grumbling wargamer in me would prefer a far more
> >detailed situation report, while the realist in me knows what we got was
> >far more accurate!
>
> I think some sort of middle path is the best, balancing 'realism' with
> actually wanting to play a wargame :-)
There was the option of augmenting your reports by communication with
your neighbours... and have the enemy read that, too...
> No prob. Now we'll just have to wait for Perry...
Please... ;)
- Markus K.
kassbohr@whu-koblenz.de is gone, don't use it
The above is my opinion and/or invention. Where applicable
(eg excluding quotes), it is my copyright.
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Date: Mon, 03 Feb 1997 22:20:07 -0800
From: Perry Andrus
Subject: Re: Watching the Video
To: forester+gd40-list@HOPE.CIT.HOPE.EDU
much of my time running 3/205 was spent worrying about my flanks. watching
the video allowed me to see all the blue units for the first time. only
once in the game did my force actually have contact with friendly units on
both flanks.
fighting in the woods really made this umpired game work. that is one
issue that has me worried about gd'41. the germans have aerial observation
so the soviets are going to have a tough time pulling lee's patented
surprises.
i prefer m'kau due to all the green. and it is only 1 map. it just plays
out slow due to the foot slogging.
>
>> No prob. Now we'll just have to wait for Perry...
>
>Please... ;)
>
> - Markus K.
> kassbohr@whu-koblenz.de is gone, don't use it
Perry
Costa Mesa, CA
pandrus@earthlink.net
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Date: Tue, 04 Feb 1997 07:28:33 -0500
From: Lee Forester
Subject: Re: Watching the Video
To: forester+gd40-list@HOPE.CIT.HOPE.EDU, pandrus@earthlink.net
>i prefer m'kau due to all the green. and it is only 1 map. it just plays
>out slow due to the foot slogging.
Matanikau can work fine if you run hour turns to make up for the
slow movement. There is VERY little communication there as radios
(such as existed) tended not to work, especially for the Japanese.
On GD '41, it will of course be a different game with the
relatively open fields of observation, so planning would
probably play a bigger role than surprise, except for the Germans.
However, armored groups can move VERY fast, and it always takes
a while for aerial info to trickle down to the units, so quick
movements still might catch someone flatfooted.
Lee
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Date: Wed, 05 Feb 1997 00:23:23 +0100
From: Markus Kaessbohrer
Subject: Re: Watching the Video
To: forester+gd40-list@HOPE.CIT.HOPE.EDU
On 4 Feb 97, Lee Forester gave me the pleasure of reading (on Re:
Watching the Video):
> >i prefer m'kau due to all the green. and it is only 1 map. it just plays
> >out slow due to the foot slogging.
>
> Matanikau can work fine if you run hour turns to make up for the
> slow movement. There is VERY little communication there as radios
> (such as existed) tended not to work, especially for the Japanese.
Please, not the sole TCS game that I do not own... in a pinch, why
not Leros?
> On GD '41, it will of course be a different game with the
> relatively open fields of observation, so planning would
> probably play a bigger role than surprise, except for the Germans.
> However, armored groups can move VERY fast, and it always takes
> a while for aerial info to trickle down to the units, so quick
> movements still might catch someone flatfooted.
Second that. Or failing that, a clever plan. An op sheet that has a
unit move as if to attack in the north, then swing round behind the
lines and crash into the southern end of the enemy line could result
in severe dislocation of enemy reserves, especially with so little
artillery available to interdict such movements. With the Russians at
a three command rating for defences, this could become a very
interesting game (after all, defences do allow counter-attacks...).
- Markus K.
kassbohr@whu-koblenz.de is gone, don't use it
The above is my opinion and/or invention. Where applicable
(eg excluding quotes), it is my copyright.
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Date: Tue, 04 Feb 1997 17:43:43 -0800
From: Perry Andrus
Subject: Re: Watching the Video
To: forester+gd40-list@HOPE.CIT.HOPE.EDU
markus,
if i am to be cajoled into umpiring said game then i have 2 concerns.
where to set it up for over 1 year ranks at the top. 1 map games have the
edge and 3 map games have no chance. i have dak setup now, 5 maps, and
when it comes down, gd'42 goes up with 3 maps. that leaves my dining room
table which holds up to 2 maps.
sorry about my "limited" resources. just be glad i have no cat or wife to
negate the whole deal.
Perry
Costa Mesa, CA
pandrus@earthlink.net
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Date: Wed, 05 Feb 1997 00:47:39 -0500 (EST)
From: VEERMAN@delphi.com
Subject: Re: Watching the Video
To: forester@cs.hope.edu
>I really appreciate the opportunity to watch the replay!
>Thanks, Lee for recording it!
Sure. This answers a question of mine as to whether it
was worth it to film the whole game. I used it to create
the replay, so that was nice (didn't have to write everything down
all the time). It sounds like the players can get something
out of it too.
__________________________
I would echo that again. Enjoyed it emensly (sp) even though I came in
late.
________________________________-
>After seeing this, the grumbling wargamer in me would prefer a far more
>detailed situation report, while the realist in me knows what we got was
>far more accurate!
I think some sort of middle path is the best, balancing 'realism' with
actually wanting to play a wargame :-)
_____________________________
It is hard to go from playing this game with a significantly much more
control, to feeling like a horse. You always being led somewhere, but never
know what is around you while you are getting to your objective. This
includes the "BYRDS" that keep dropping their "eggs" from the air, that you
did not know were up there to begin with.
_______________________________
>Thanks again for all your effort, Lee!
No prob. Now we'll just have to wait for Perry...
Lee
4.
______________________________________________________
I second that. Have we heard from Perry yet?
Mark
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Date: Wed, 05 Feb 1997 19:25:23 +0100
From: Markus Kaessbohrer
Subject: Re: Watching the Video
To: forester+gd40-list@HOPE.CIT.HOPE.EDU
On 4 Feb 97, Perry Andrus gave me the pleasure of reading (on Re:
Watching the Video):
> if i am to be cajoled into umpiring said game then i have 2 concerns.
> where to set it up for over 1 year ranks at the top. 1 map games have the
> edge and 3 map games have no chance. i have dak setup now, 5 maps, and
> when it comes down, gd'42 goes up with 3 maps. that leaves my dining room
> table which holds up to 2 maps.
>
> sorry about my "limited" resources. just be glad i have no cat or wife to
> negate the whole deal.
Perry,
you're the most important person in this thing, so any constraints on
your end are binding. If I'd have to buy Matanikau air mail, so be
it (although I still think GD '41 would be very interesting).
- Markus K.
kassbohr@whu-koblenz.de is gone, don't use it
The above is my opinion and/or invention. Where applicable
(eg excluding quotes), it is my copyright.
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Date: Fri, 07 Feb 1997 10:01:07 -0500
From: Lee Forester
Subject: Flavigny speaks
To: forester+gd40-list@HOPE.CIT.HOPE.EDU
Flavigny is slowly leaning how to use e-mail and sent this to me to post to the
list.
----------
Hello, my name is Matt Means, I was gen. Flavigny in our recent game.
Before I discuss my idea's and reflections, I would like to thank Lee for
his time and effort in making this game such an enjoyable experiece for all
of us, it took alot of work and he has gone above and beyond the call of duty!
When deciding how to formulate my battle plan for the french I had
several overriding goals; 1st I wanted my attack on Stonne to happen late in
the day, to give me time to collect as many of my troops as possible so that
the numbers would make a differance at Stonne and to avoid a possible German
counter attack because of darkness. 2nd I felt the german Stuka's and
artillary were superior and wanted a plan that would keep my troops out of
the open and off the roads. If Jerry couldn't see us we could confuse him as
to our strength and whereabouts and not allow him to bring his greater
firepower down on us. 3rd and most important I felt I needed a plan that
covered the whole day. Our prep ratings were so bad that if orders had to
be changed once the day started they might not ever be implemented and I
would end up with pockets of troops spread around the map doing nothing. So
the day was divided up into phases, each with a set goal,[a place to meet, a
Location, etc.] Because I was unsure which troops would be available to me
in the p.m. 90% of the op sheets issued to the optional reinforcements had
the same sets of orders assigned to them. That way no matter who appeared I
would be able to accomplish the limited goals set for those troops south of
Stonne. One last comment before moving on, realizing the excellent prep
rating of the Germans I was concerned about radio intercepts and Jerry's
ability to react to this info. On a whim I made up code names for locations
all over the map I felt we may need to refer to during the game. I sent
these to our commanders with orders not to use hex numbers or locations by
name and to keep radio traffic to an absolute minimum. Once the game
started and I started intercepting a fairly regular stream of enemy reports
I continued to push for radio silence, I followed behind my troops approx. 5
movement points so as to hold down the lag time between our messengers. I
would be interested in knowing what the germans were able to gleen from our
radio intercepts?
Other than keeping our troops up to date with intell reports about enemy
troops and strenghts they were facing, approx. Location of Jerry's overall
positions it didn't do us much good. However I feel if my prep rating was
better I could have done serious damage with the information available. I
know Katzeborn like a brother, he probably keeps a very detailed [and
Volumous] diary, or maybe he was a radio broadcaster before the war. :-)
The one time the radio intercepts came in handy was when I was able to warn
our troops in the woods just west of Stonne of a counterattack by 6-II-8 and
2/3 of I-69 in mid afternoon. We had units of II-g.d. on the run and where
spread out in pursuit,because of the intercept, when Jerry attacked he hit a
fairly solid wall, so a word to the wise in future umpired games - watch your
radio's they can be good and bad. More later...
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Date: Sat, 08 Feb 1997 03:20:38 +0100
From: Markus Kaessbohrer
Subject: Re: Flavigny speaks
To: forester+gd40-list@HOPE.CIT.HOPE.EDU
On 7 Feb 97, Lee Forester gave me the pleasure of reading (on
Flavigny speaks):
Thanks for the great information.
> would be interested in knowing what the germans were able to gleen from our
> radio intercepts?
I remember one radio intercept forwarded at the beginning, which gave
a pretty clear warning of a left hand sweep (although I remember my
interpretation was that they were to meet someone coming from your
right). I think I dismissed it as a fake at the time, and it didn't
concern me anyway.
No more intercepts made it to me afterwards.
> know Katzeborn like a brother, he probably keeps a very detailed [and
Hi, that's me. I was under a #completely# wrong impression as to the
probability of intercepts. I thought something like one in twenty,
not one in six! Under that assumption, the benefits of co-ordination
seemed larger than the loss due to intercepts. With no intercepts of
our own I had no way of seeing what I mistake I made.
I also didn't know that there was a sort of automatic sitrep every
turn, so I sent one to Lange after every result. You probably liked
those.
Third, we had zero communications security - no codenames for
nothing. You probably liked my message headers, too...
> spread out in pursuit,because of the intercept, when Jerry attacked he hit a
> fairly solid wall, so a word to the wise in future umpired games - watch your
I know now!
- Markus K.
kassbohr@whu-koblenz.de is gone, don't use it
The above is my opinion and/or invention. Where applicable
(eg excluding quotes), it is my copyright.
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