

JOSEPH FRANCIS LAPORTE's Condensed CV (August, 2010)

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EDUCATION

Ph.D. in philosophy, University of Massachusetts at Amherst: May, 1998

M.A. in philosophy, University College London: 1993

B.A., summa cum laude, in philosophy, Franciscan University of Steubenville, Ohio: 1991

TEACHING POSITIONS

7/2004–Present: Associate Professor: Hope College, Holland, MI

7/1998–6/2004: Assistant Professor: Hope College

9/1994-1/1997: Instructor and teaching assistant: University of Massachusetts/Amherst

AREAS OF RESEARCH

My primary research areas are in the philosophy of language, metaphysics, philosophy of biology, philosophy of science. I also do some work in the philosophy of religion and epistemology. Recently I have been working on the topic of rigid designators for properties and theoretical identities, especially psychophysical identities.

ARTICLES

(2010) "Theoretical Identity Statements, their Truth, and their Discovery," in H. Beebe & N. Sabbarton-Leary (ed), *The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds*, New York: Routledge.

This paper came out of a talk in October of 2007, where I spoke at a small workshop in Turku, Finland on natural kinds and also at a conference in Birmingham, UK. The Birmingham event was *Nature and its Classification: a Metaphysics of Science Conference*, which opened up with a symposium on my book *Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change* (see <http://www.bristol.ac.uk/metaphysicsofscience/programme.html>).

(2009) "On Systematists' Single Objective Tree of Ancestors and Descendants," *Biological Theory: Integrating Development, Evolution, and Cognition* 4, 260-66.

This paper came out of a talk in March of 2008, where I spoke at the Edges & Boundaries of Biological Objects Workshop, at the University of Utah (see <http://www.phylosophy.org/eb>).

(2009) "On Two Reasons for Denying that Bodies Can Outlast Life," *Mind* 118, 795-801.

(2007) "In Defense of *Species*," *Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences* 38, 255-69.

- (2006) "Rigid Designators," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rigid-designators/index.html>
- (2006) "Two-Dimensionalism Against Materialism," supplementary document for "Rigid Designators," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rigid-designators/twodim.html>
- (2006) "Species as Relations: Examining a New Proposal," *Biology and Philosophy*. 21, pp. 381-93.
- (2006) "Rigid Designators for Properties," *Philosophical Studies* 130, pp. 321-36.
- (2005) "Is There a Single Objective, Evolutionary Tree of Life?," *The Journal of Philosophy* 102, pp. 357-74.
- (2003) "Does a Type Specimen Necessarily or Contingently Belong to Its Species?," *Biology and Philosophy* 18: 583-588.
- (2002) "Must Signals Handicap?," *The Monist* 85: 86-104.
- (2001) "Selection for Handicaps," *Biology and Philosophy* 16: 239-249.
- (2000) "Rigidity and Kind," *Philosophical Studies*, 97: 293-316.
- (1998) "Living Water," *Mind*, 107: 451-455.
- (1997) "Essential Membership," *Philosophy of Science*, 64: 96-112.
- (1996) "Chemical Kind Term Reference and the Discovery of Essence," *NOÛS*, 30: 112-132.
- (1996) "Locke's Semantics and the New Theory of Reference to Natural Kinds," *Locke Newsletter*, 27: 41-64.
- (1995) "In Search of Pigeonholes," *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 45: 499-505.

BOOKS

- (forthcoming) *Rigid Designation and Theoretical Identities*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. I'm preparing the final draft, which I will submit in the spring of 2011.
- (2004 February) *Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Table of contents and Introduction are available online:
<http://assets.cambridge.org/052182/5997/sample/0521825997ws.pdf>.

PUBLISHED RESPONSES TO MY WORK

Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change has been reviewed by the following:

R. W. Fischer in *Erkenntnis* 69, 2008, pp. 415–419

C. J. Bolton in *Mind* 116, 2007, pp. 184–7.

Jussi Haukioja in *International Studies in the Philosophy of Science* 21, 2007, pp. 216–218.

G. McOuat, in *Isis* 97, 2006, p. 594.

D. Braddon-Mitchell in *Biology and Philosophy* 20, 2006, pp. 859–68.

Jochen Faseler in *Review of Metaphysics* 59, 2005, pp. 438–40.

Rachel Cooper in *History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences* 27, 2005, p. 543.

Muhammad Ali Khalidi in *Philosophy of Science* 72, 2005, p. 519–23

Thomas Reydon in the *Philosophical Quarterly* 55, 2005, pp. 672–4;

R. A. Richards in *International Philosophical Quarterly* 45, 2005, pp. 412–413

Andrew Woodfield in *Philosophical Books* 3, 2005, pp. 272–3.

John Dupré in *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*, 2004.06.01: see

<http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=1439>

Neil Levy in *Metapsychology Online Reviews*, 2004, 8, 8: see

<http://mentalthelp.net/books/books.php?type=de&id=2069>

Rob Wilson in *Philosophy in Review* 24, 2004, pp. 423–6.

Robin Hendry in *Philosophical Writings* 27, 2004, pp. 71–4;

Other high-quality discussions of my work include:

Beebe, H. & Sabbarton-Leary, N., ed. (2010) *The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds*, New York: Routledge. (selections)

Velasco, Joel (2008) “Species concepts should not conflict with evolutionary history, but often do,” *Stud. Hist. Phil. Biol. & Biomed. Sci.* 39, pp. 407–414

Bird, Alexander (2007) “A Posteriori Knowledge of Natural Kind Essences: A Defence,” *Philosophical Topics* 35.

Hacking, Ian (2007) “The contingencies of ambiguity,” *Analysis* 67, pp. 269–77.

Oderberg, David (2007) *Real Essentialism*. London: Routledge.

Hendry, Robin Findlay. 2006. “Elements, Compounds, and Other Chemical Kinds.” *Philosophy of Science* 73, pp. 864–875.

Devitt, Michael (2005) “Rigid Application,” *Philosophical Studies* 125: 139–65.

Okasha S. (2002) “Darwinian Metaphysics: Species and the Question of Essentialism,” *Synthese*, 131, pp. 191–213.

Schwartz, Stephen P. (2002) “Kinds, General Terms, and Rigidity: A Reply to LaPorte,” *Philosophical Studies* 109, 265–77.

Segal, Gabriel (2000) *A Slim Book About Narrow Content*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.